When the Nuclear Reactor Building was first discussed, one of the first and most important items described was a 10 ton crane (later reduced to 6 tons) to be used as the major tool in assembling and dis- assembling the reactor and in moving auxiliary apparatus in the reactor room. From the first also there has been more trouble on this piece of equipment than on any other; first in settling on a design, then in completing the design in a reasonable time, then in arriving at under- standings between contractor, vendor, manufacturer and architect,--and now on the unsatisfactory performance of the crane and its failure to meet either the design specifications or the expectations of the owners.

It has now become rather clear,--or the manufacturer's agents claim this is so--that the crane performance would not have met the owners anticipations even if all the design specifications as submitted by the architect had been met. This I have been unable to ascertain because of the manner in which the specifications are drawn. For example, certain rather critical dimensional clearances are specified only in terms of a particular make and model of equipment, and the dimensions of this equipment is available only in manufacturer's catalogues. Thus, whether this equipment as specified or whether a different type as sub- stituted would meet desired performance characteristics, I am not in position to say.

The matters which now are definitely clear are (1) the crane as finally delivered and installed does not coincide in several respects with the architects specifications, and (2) the performance of the crane as installed falls far short of the owners' requirements.

To make this clear let me enumerate the items in which have not been satisfied: 1. The crane hook now will not approach the walls of the room closer than 5 feet or so. The original stipulation was 24" for this distance. Anything more than 26" is not satisfactory; anything more than 30" (as measured from the nearest approach on the concrete wall, not the glued tile) will not be accepted. 2. The rate of travel of the "bridge" is at least twice too fast. The brake action is too abrupt. The speed should be reduced by at least a factor of 2; the brake should be removed. The present rate of stopping and starting is hazardous to personnel and dangerous to the delicate equipment to be handled.